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By  JACK OCHS AND ALVIN  E.  ROTH* 
In  a study of alternating offer bargaining with discounting,  perfect equilibrium 
was found to have little predictive  power, under the conventional  assumption that 
bargainers' utility is  measured by  their monetary payoffs.  Instead,  our data 
exhibit a first-mover advantage, independent  of the equilibrium  prediction. How- 
ever the pattern of rejected offers and counterproposals  shows bargainers' utility 
was not  measured by their monetary  payoffs: 81 percent of rejected offers were 
followed by counterproposals  that would earn less money. We also reanalyze data 
from earlier experiments,  finding a similar pattern of rejections and counterpro- 
posals. 
Recently  there  has  been  a  good  deal  of 
attention  given to models of  two-party bar- 
gaining in which time is divided into periods, 
and the opportunity to make an offer alter- 
nates  between  the  bargainers.  In  a  given 
period,  one  bargainer makes an offer which 
the other may accept or reject. If the offer is 
accepted,  bargaining ends  and the bargain- 
ers receive their agreed payoffs. If the offer 
is  declined  in  any but the last period, then 
in  the  next  period  the  other  bargainer is 
the  one  to  make  an offer, but  the value to 
the  bargainers  of  any  potential  agreement 
shrinks according to  some discount factors, 
which may be different for the two bargain- 
ers. The bargaining ends in disagreement if 
no offer has been accepted by the end of the 
last period. 
Such a game has many strategic equilibria, 
but  most  of  these  can  be  thought  of  as 
involving  an attempt by one of the bargain- 
ers to  threaten a course of  action which he 
would not wish to carry out if his bluff were 
called.  For  example, in  a two-period game, 
the  player who  makes the offer in  the first 
period,  player  1,  might demand 99 percent 
of  the  gains  from  trade  for  himself,  and 
threaten  that  if  player  2  refuses  to  accept 
this  offer,  then  in  the  second  period  he 
(player  1) will  refuse  any offer, so that dis- 
agreement  will  result  and  each  player will 
receive  nothing.  If  this  threat  is  believed, 
player  2's  best  response is  to  accept  the  1 
percent he is offered in the first period. But 
the threat implies that, if player 2 rejects the 
offer in  the  first period, player 1 will reject 
offers in the next period that he would then 
prefer to accept. For this reason such threats 
may not be  credible. The class of  equilibria 
which do not involve such threats are called 
subgame perfect. 
Specifically, the basic model is the follow- 
ing:  two bargainers, 1 and 2, alternate mak- 
ing offers over how to divide some amount k 
(for  example,  of  money).  Time  is  divided 
into  periods,  and  in  odd-numbered periods 
t  (starting  at  an initial period  t =1)  player 
1 may propose  to player 2 any division (x, 
k -  x).  If player 2 accepts this proposal then 
the game ends and player 1 receives a utility 
of (S,)P'-)x  and 2 receives a utility (82)(t1) 
(k -  x),  where Si is a number between 0 and 
1 reflecting player i's  cost of delay. (That is, 
a payoff of  y  dollars to player i  at period t 
gives him the same utility as a payoff of  Siy 
dollars at period  t -  1). If player 2 does not 
accept  the  offer, and if  period  t  is not  the 
final  period  of  the  game,  then  the  game 
proceeds to period t + 1, and the roles of the 
two players are reversed. If an offer made in 
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the last period of the game is refused,  then 
the game ends with each player  receiving  0. 
A game with a maximum  number  of periods 
T will be called a T-period  game.' 
A  subgame-perfect  equilibrium can  be 
computed by  working backward  from the 
last period. An offer  made in period T is an 
ultimatum, and so  at such an equilibrium 
player i (who will receive  0 if he rejects  the 
offer)  will accept any nonnegative  offer  when 
payoffs are continuously  divisible.2  So at a 
subgame-perfect  equilibrium, player j,  who 
gets to make the proposal  in period T, will 
receive 100 percent of the amount k  to be 
divided, if the game continues  to period T. 
Consequently  at period T-1  player j  will 
refuse any offer of less than  (8j)k but accept 
any offer of  more, so  that at equilibrium 
player i  receives the share k -  (8j)k  if the 
game goes to period T-  1, and so at period 
T-2  he must be offered  (81)(k  -(8j)k),  and 
so forth. Working  back to period 1 in this 
way, we can compute the equilibrium  divi- 
sion:  that is,  the amount that the theory 
predicts  player 1 should offer to player  2 at 
period 1, and player  2 should  accept.  (When 
payoffs are continuous  this equilibrium  divi- 
sion is unique).  So, when payoffs  are contin- 
uous, subgame-perfect  equilibrium  in a two- 
period game calls for player  1 to offer  player 
2  the amount 82k  in the first period (and 
demand k -82k  for himself), while in  a 
three-period  game player 1 offers player 2 
the amount 82(k -  8lk) in the first period, 
and demands k -  82(k -  8lk)  for himself. 
Recent experimental  studies of sequential 
bargaining problems of  this kind have re- 
ported markedly  different  results.  Their au- 
thors have drawn quite different,  sometimes 
mutually  contradictory  conclusions  about  the 
predictive  value of perfect  equilibrium  mod- 
els of  bargaining,  and about the role that 
experience, limited foresight,  or bargainers' 
beliefs about fairness  might  play in explain- 
ing their observations.  (Questions  of fairness 
arise because in some of these experiments 
many observed agreements  give both bar- 
gainers  50 percent  of the available  money). 
Each of these recent experiments  was de- 
signed to  correspond to  the case that the 
players have equal discount factors, that is, 
81  =  82=  8.  Following standard  practice in 
the experimental  literature  when only ordi- 
nal utilities are of concern,  the utility of the 
bargainers  was assumed  to be measured  by 
the amount of money they receive.  The cost- 
liness of delay in these experiments  was im- 
plemented  by making  the amount  of money 
being  divided in  period t +1  equal to  8 
times the amount available  at period t. (So 
the value of  any fixed-percentage  share of 
the pie is multiplied  by 8 from  one period  to 
the next). In a number  of these studies the 
number of periods, T, was identified  as the 
critical variable that distinguishes  between 
the games  in these  different  experiments  (and 
sometimes also within an experiment).  The 
amount of experience  that subjects acquire 
in  the experiment (that is, the number of 
times they bargain) has also been consid- 
ered. Analysis of the data primarily  focused 
on the accuracy  of the perfect  equilibrium  as 
a  point predictor, that is, on whether the 
observed outcomes were distributed  around 
the perfect equilibrium  division or around 
some other division of the available  money. 
This paper reports a new experiment  de- 
signed to test the predictive  accuracy  of some 
of  the  qualitative predictions of  the perfect 
equilibrium  in sequential  bargaining.  Our  ex- 
periment is implemented  in a way that al- 
lows the discount factors  of the two bargain- 
ers to  be  varied independently.  The exp- 
erimental design allows us  to  make com- 
parisons between different  combinations  of 
discount factors  for games  of fixed  length,  as 
well as between  games  of different  length  for 
given discount factors. The data will also 
permit us to consider  whether  the utility of 
the bargainers  is accurately  measured  by their 
monetary  payoffs,  and to consider  the effects 
of expenence. 
Much of the recent  theoretical  work  using  this kind 
of  model follows the treatment  by Ariel Rubinstein 
(1982) of the infinite horizon  case. An exploration  of 
various aspects of the finite horizon  case is given by 
Ingolf Stahl  (1972). 
2If  payoffs are discrete,  so that offers can only be 
made to the nearest  penny,  for example,  then there  are 
subgame-perfect  equilibria  at which i refuses  to take 0 
but accepts  the smallest  positive  offer,  for example,  one 
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This  experiment  was  thus  designed  to 
make a more comprehensive test of the the- 
ory  than  has  previously  been  attempted. 
Specifically, it was designed to detect whether 
changes  in  the  parameters of  the  game in- 
fluence  the  observed  outcomes  in  the  pre- 
dicted  direction, even in the case that there 
might  be  a  systematic  error in  the  point 
predictions. We will argue that the results of 
this new experiment also suggest a plausible 
explanation  of  why  the earlier experiments 
observed such widely varying results. Before 
describing  and  analyzing  the  new  experi- 
ment,  we set  the stage with a brief descrip- 
tion of the earlier experiments. 
I.  The Earlier Experiments 
A.  The Experiments  of Werner  Giith, 
Rolf Schmittberger,  and 
Bernd Schwarz (1982) 
The  first experiment of  this study exam- 
ined  one-period  ("ultimatum")  bargaining 
games. Players were divided into two groups 
of equal size, to be matched at random with 
players  of  the  other group. The  players in 
one  of  the  two  groups  would  always  be 
"Player  1," that is,  would  always have  the 
first move. Player 1 could propose dividing a 
fixed sum of  k  deutsche marks any way he 
chose,  by  filling  out  a  form  saying  "I  de- 
mand  DM  x ."  Player 2  could  either ac- 
cept, in which case player 1 received x  and 
player  2  got  k -  x,  or  he  could  reject, in 
which  case  each  player received 0  for  that 
game. The perfect equilibrium prediction for 
such  games  is  that  player 1  will  receive  k 
and player 2 will receive 0. 
There were 21 "naive" interactions (data 
gathered  from  inexperienced  subjects)  and 
21 "experienced" interactions (data gathered 
one  week  later  from  the  same  subjects). 
(There  were  three  games  each  with  k = 
4, ...  ,10).  From the 21 naive interactions, the 
modal proposal by player 1 (7 times) was for 
a  50  percent  share for  himself  (and  so  an 
equal  share  for  player 2),  and  the  average 
proposal  was  for  a  65  percent  share  for 
player  1.  There  were two  proposals  asking 
for (the  equilibrium prediction of)  100 per- 
cent  for player 1. No  other proposal asked 
for  as much  as 90 percent. There were two 
disagreements, one of them in response to a 
demand for 100 percent. (The other demand 
for  100  percent  was  accepted).  For  the  21 
experienced  interactions,  there  were  three 
50-50  proposals,  and  one  100-e (with  e= 
DM.01)  proposal.  No  other proposal asked 
for  as  much  as  90  percent.  There  were  6 
disagreements.  The  average  demand  by 
player 1 was for a 69 percent share. Thus in 
neither case did the proposals approach the 
equilibrium  prediction  for  demands of  100 
percent. 
The authors conclude that "...  . subjects of- 
ten  rely  on  what  they  consider  a  fair  or 
justified  result. Furthermore, the ultimatum 
aspect cannot  be completely exploited since 
subjects  do  not  hesitate  to  punish  if  their 
opponent  asks for 'too  much'." 
B.  The Experiment of Ken Binmore, 
Avner Shaked, and 
John Sutton (1985)3 
This  work  was  motivated  by  the  above 
study. The authors say: "The work of Guth 
et al. seems to preclude a predictive role for 
game  theory insofar as bargaining behavior 
is concerned.  Our purpose in this note is to 
report briefly on  an experiment that shows 
that this conclusion is unwarranted.... 
The  experiment  studied  a  2-period  bar- 
gaining  game, whose rules are that player 1 
makes a proposal of the form (x, 100 -  x)  to 
divide  100 pence. If player 2 accepts, this is 
the result. Otherwise player 2 makes a pro- 
posal  (x', 25-  x')  to  divide  25  pence.  If 
3Some of  the description of this experiment is taken 
from  the  original,  more detailed report of  the experi- 
ment  contained  in  the authors' 1984 discussion paper. 
We are grateful to the authors for explaining to us how 
to read some of their tables. 
4They  add: "This does not mean that our results are 
inconsistent  with  those  of  Guth  et  al.  Under  similar 
conditions,  we obtain similar results. Moreover our full 
results would seem to refute the more obvious rational- 
izations  of  the  behavior  observed  by  Giuth et  al.  as 
'optimising  with complex motivations.' Instead, our re- 
sults indicate that this behavior is not stable in the sense 
that  it  can  be  easily  displaced  by  simple  optimizing 
behavior,  once  small changes are made in  the playing 
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player 1 accepts, this is the result,  otherwise 
each player receives 0. Thus in  this game 
=1  =  .25,  and (since proposals are con- 
strained to be an integer  number  of pence) 
at any subgame-perfect  equilibrium  player  1 
makes an  opening demand in  the  range 
74-76 pence, and player  2 accepts  any open- 
ing demand of  74 pence or less. Subjects 
played a single game, after which player 2 
was invited to play the game  again,  as player 
1.  In  fact  there was no  player 2  in  this 
second game, so only the opening demand 
was observed. 
The data for the first  game reveal  a mode 
around a first demand  near 50 pence. Of 81 
observations,5  only 8 were  in the equilibrium 
interval  of 74-76 pence. First demands  were 
rejected 12 times. In the second game (in 
which only  first demands were observed), 
there  was a mode around  a first  demand  just 
below 75 pence, with 30 of the 81 demands 
being in  the  equilibrium  interval [74-76]. 
There  was thus a clear  shift between  the two 
distributions  of first demands,  in the direc- 
tion of the equilibrium  demand. 
The authors conclude "Our suspicion is 
that the one-stage  ultimatum  game  is a rather 
special case, from which it is dangerous  to 
draw general conclusions.  In the ultimatum 
game, the first player might be dissuaded 
from making  an opening  demand  at, or close 
to, the 'optimum' level, because his oppo- 
nent would then incur a negligible  cost in 
making an 'irrational'  rejection.  In the two- 
stage game, these considerations  are post- 
poned to the second stage, and so their im- 
pact is attenuated." 
C.  The Experiment of Giuth  and 
Reinhard Tietz (1987) 
This  paper is  a  response to  Binmore, 
Shaked, and Sutton (1985). The experiment 
examined two,  two-stage games with dis- 
count factors  of .9 and .1 respectively.  So the 
subgame-perfect  equilibrium  predictions  (in 
percentage terms) for the two cases are (10 
percent,  90 percent)  and (90 and 10 percent), 
respectively.  The authors  say "Our  hypothe- 
sis is  that the consistency of  experimental 
observations  and game-theoretic  predictions 
observed  by Binmore  et al. (1985),  as well as 
by Sidney Siegal and Lawrence  Fouraker,  is 
solely due to the moderate  relation  of equi- 
librium  payoffs which makes  the game-theo- 
retic solution socially  more acceptable." 
Subjects played two games, each with a 
randomly chosen other bargainer.  Subjects 
who played the first  game as player  1 played 
the second game as player  2. One difference 
from the sequential bargaining  games dis- 
cussed above was that disagreement  auto- 
matically resulted if  player 2  rejected an 
offer from player 1 but made a counterpro- 
posal that would give him less than player  1 
had offered him. Note that this rule makes 
the games more like ultimatum  games,  since 
some  demands of  player 1  (for example, 
demands of less than 90 percent in games 
with discount factor of .1) can only be re- 
jected at the cost of disagreement. 
In the first game, the average  first  demand 
in games with a discount  factor  of .1 was 76 
percent, and in the second game 67 percent. 
For games with a discount factor of .9, the 
average  first  demand  in the first  game  was 70 
percent, and in the second game 59 percent. 
(Recall that when the discount factor is .9, 
the equilibrium  first demand  is only 10 per- 
cent). 
The authors  conclude  that "Our main re- 
sult is that contrary  to Binmore,  Shaked,  and 
Sutton, 'gamesmenship'  is  clearly rejected, 
that is, the game-theoretic  solution  has nearly 
no predictive  power." 
D.  The Experiment of Janet Neelin, 
Hugo Sonnenschein, and 
Matthew Spiegel (1988) 
This paper is also a response  to Binmore, 
Shaked, and  Sutton (1985).6 Two experi- 
ments are reported:  in the first, 80 students 
50r  perhaps  82:  there is a discrepancy between  the 
histogram in  the published version and in the working 
paper, and the table in the working paper. 
6Who in turn make a brief reply in Binmore, Shaked, 
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from a microeconomics class played 2-period, 
3-period, and 5-period bargaining games, in 
order,  against  different opponents  (after  a 
practice  game).  In  the  second,  30  students 
from  a  similar  class  played  three 5-period 
games (after a practice game). There was a 
single  discount  rate  for  both  players,  ad- 
justed across games so that (in experiment 1) 
the  round  I  pie  was  always worth $5,  and 
the perfect equilibrium demand was always 
$3.75.  (This  meant  that  the  second  period 
pie was $1.25, $2.50, and $1.70 in the 2-, 3-, 
and  5-period  games,  respectively,  corre- 
sponding  to  discount  factors of  .25, .5, and 
.34, respectively). In experiment 2, the game 
was the same as the 5-period game of experi- 
ment 1, with payoffs multiplied by 3. 
The  authors  summarize  their  data  and 
conclusions  as  follows:  " Neither  the 
Stahl/Rubinstein  nor the equal-split models 
predict the bargaining behavior observed in 
our  six  games.  A  convenient  summary of 
what we  observed is  that in each game the 
sellers  offered  the  buyers  the  value  of  the 
second-round pie." That is, they observe that 
the  data  for  all  their (2-,  3-, and  5-period) 
games  are near the perfect equilibrium pre- 
diction  for 2-period games. 
II. The New Experimental  Design 
The new experiment used the 4 x 2 design 
shown  in  Table  1. The two  treatment vari- 
ables were the discount rates 81 and  82  (the 
4-way variable, with values (81, 82)  =  (.4,.4), 
(.6,.4),  (.6,.6),  and (.4,.6)) and the number of 
periods T (with values T = 2,3).  In addition, 
each  subject participated in ten consecutive 
bargaining encounters with the same param- 
eters, against different individuals. 
Since some cells of the design require dif- 
ferent discount  rates for the two bargainers, 
the discounting could not be implemented as 
in  the  previous  experiments, by  simply  re- 
ducing the sum to be divided in each period. 
Instead, in each period, the commodity to be 
divided consisted of 100 "chips." In period 1 
of  each game, each chip was worth $0.30 to 
each  bargainer. In period 2,  each chip was 
worth 81($0.30) to player 1 and 82($0.30) to 
player 2, and in period 3 of the three-period 
games each chip was worth (81)2($0.30)  and 
(82)2($0.30),  respectively.7 That is,  the rate 
at which  subjects were paid for each of  the 
100 chips  that  they might receive depended 
on  their  discount  rate  and  the  period  in 
which  agreement was reached. (See  the de- 
tailed account of procedures below). 
Table  1 gives the eight cells of the experi- 
ment,  and  the perfect equilibrium divisions 
corresponding  to  the experimental parame- 
ters, under the assumption that the bargain- 
ers'  utility  is  measured  by  their  monetary 
payoffs.8 For convenience, these equilibrium 
divisions  are  stated  both  in  chips  and  in 
dollar  value,  and  the  range of  equilibrium 
divisions  is  given  when  there  are  multiple 
perfect  equilibria due to  the discreteness of 
the medium of exchange. 
Note  that,  aside  from  the  point  predic- 
tions made by perfect equilibrium, there are 
also  a number of important qualitative pre- 
dictions. 
First,  player  l's  discount  factor  only  in- 
fluences the equilibrium division when T=  3. 
When  T = 2, only player 2's discount factor 
is predicted to matter, and so the prediction 
is that the same divisions will be reached in 
cell  1 as in cell 2, and in cell 3 as in cell 4, 
and that player 2 will do better in cells 3 and 
4 than in cells  1 and 2. 
Second,  for given discount factors for the 
two players (i.e., within a row of  the table), 
player  2  is  predicted  to  receive  a  smaller 
share when  T =3  than when  T=  2. (When 
T = 3, player 1 not only makes the first offer, 
7For  a player i with 8, =.6,  chips were worth $0.18 in 
period 2 and $0.11 in period 3 (where this latter amount 
is rounded up from $0.108, which is the exact value of 
(.6)2($0.30).  For a player with 8i =.4,  chips were worth 
$0.12 in period 2 and $0.05 in period 3, where again the 
latter figure is rounded up from $0.048. 
8Since  chips could only be divided in integer quanti- 
ties, there can be multiple perfect equilibrium divisions. 
In  cells  1 and  2  the  first-period equilibrium offers to 
player  2 can be  from 39 chips ($11.70) up to 41 chips 
($12.30),  and in cells 3 and 4 from 59 chips ($17.70) to 
61 chips ($18.30).  For the three-period games, we have 
to  take into  account  the rounding of  third-period chip 
values  to  the  nearest penny,  as noted  in  the previous 
footnote.  This yields unique equilibria in cells 5, 6, and 
8 with  first-period offers to player 2 of  24, 16, and 35 
chips,  respectively,  and in cell 7 the equlibrium  offers 
to player 2 can be either 23 or 24 chips. 360  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  JUNE  1989 
TABLE 1-EXPERIMENTAL  DESIGN, AND RANGE OF EQUILIBRIUM  DIVISIONS 
Two-Period  Three-Period 
Chips  Money  Chips  Money 
Cell 1:  Cell 5: 
(59,41)  ($17.70,$12.30) 
81=  .4,82 =.4  to  to  (76,24)  ($22.80,$7.20) 
(61,39)  ($18.30,$11.70) 
Cell 2:  Cell 6: 
81 =.6,82  =.4  (59,41)  ($17.70,$12.30) 
to  to  (84,16)  ($25.20,$4.80) 
(61,39)  ($18.30, $11.70) 
Cell 3:  Cell 7: 
a, =.6,82  =.6  (39,61)  ($11.70,$18.30)  (77,23)  ($23.10,$6.90) 
to  to  to  to 
(41,59)  ($12.30, $17.70)  (76,24)  ($22.80, $7.20) 
Cell 4:  Cell 8: 
81 =.4,82  =.6  (39,61)  ($11.70,$18.30) 
to  to  (65,35)  ($19.50,$10.50) 
(41,59)  ($12.30, $17.70) 
before discounting  takes its toll, but he also 
has the opportunity to make the last offer). 
The  theory's predictions include, in addi- 
tion,  all  28  pairwise  comparisons  between 
cells.9 And  since  each  bargainer played  10 
games, all in the same cell, against different, 
anonymous  opponents,  the design also per- 
mits us to investigate the effects that experi- 
ence  may  have  on  the outcome  of  the bar- 
gaining. 
A.  Methods 
Subjects were recruited from undergradu- 
ate  economics  classes  at  the  University  of 
Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University. 
They  were  told  that  they  would  be  paid 
$5.00  for  showing  up on  time, and that, in 
addition,  they would have an opportunity to 
bargain  over  a  sum  of  $30.  Each  subject 
participated  in  only  one  cell  of  the experi- 
ment,  and  all  observations for  a given cell 
were  conducted  in  a single session.  Partici- 
pants  were  assembled  in  a  room  and  ran- 
domly  assigned  code  numbers which deter- 
mined whether they would be in the position 
of  player  1 or 2 in the subsequent bargain- 
ing.  (In  the instructions, the player 1 and 2 
positions were called the "Right" and "Left" 
positions,  respectively).  The  instructions, 
which  were distributed and read aloud, are 
presented in Appendix 1. Note  that the mes- 
sage  form  on  which  offers were exchanged 
presents  the  cash  value  per  chip  for  each 
player for each period, and that the players 
were  required  to  keep  records  which  in- 
volved  computing  the  cash  value  of  each 
offer.  Following  the instructions, a practice 
game was played, after which all participants 
were separated into two rooms (so all player 
l's  were in  one  room  and  all player 2's in 
another)  and  reseated,  in  an  order  deter- 
mined  by the randomly assigned code num- 
ber. In the subsequent bargaining, each par- 
ticipant bargained consecutively with each of 
the  participants  in  the other room, without 
knowing who he was bargaining with in any 
given  round.  All  subjects  knew  that  they 
would  be bargaining with a different person 
from round to round during a session. Each 
round,  of  course, consisted of  either 2 or 3 
periods, depending on the cell. Subjects were 
told  that,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  experi- 
9 Note  the  role  that  the design plays  in  facilitating 
these  comparisons.  For  example, in  the experiment of 
Neelin  et al., in which discount factor and game length 
were varied simultaneously, their individual effects can- 
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ment, one of the rounds would be chosen at 
random and they would be paid the result of 
that round. 
III. Results  of the New Experiment 
A.  Observations  Related to the 
Equilibrium  Predictions 
(i)  Opening  Offers. Figures  IA  and  lB 
display  the  following  data  for  each  cell  of 
our experiment: (1) the number of bargain- 
ing  pairs  per  round;  (2)  the  mean  of  the 
observed  first-period  offers  to  player  2  in 
each of the 10 rounds; (3) the maximum and 
minimum  first-period offers in  each round; 
(4) plus and minus two standard errors from 
the mean offer in each round; (5) the num- 
ber of first-period offers that were rejected in 
each  round.  In  addition  to  the  data,  the 
perfect equilibrium offer and the equal divi- 
sion  offer  (which  is  always  $15)  are  dis- 
played. The offers made in round 10 of each 
cell represent the behavior of the most expe- 
rienced bargainers. As the figures show, the 
subgame-perfect  equilibrium offer is  gener- 
ally  a very poor  point  predictor of  the ob- 
served outcomes. Cell One is the only cell in 
which the perfect equilibrium offer is within 
two  standard errors of  the observed mean. 
In no other cell does the perfect equilibrium 
offer fall within plus or minus two standard 
errors of the estimated population mean. 
The subgame-perfect equilibrium not only 
fails as a point predictor of observed behav- 
ior,  it  also  fails  to  account  for  observed 
qualitative  differences. One  qualitative pre- 
diction  of  the  theory  is  that  a  change  in 
player  l's  discount  factor  should  have  no 
influence  on  the  proposals  made  in  two- 
period games. Table 2 presents estimates of 
the standard error of the distribution of dif- 
ferences in sample means and the 95 percent 
confidence  limits  for  the  difference in  ex- 
pected  offers, given  the observed difference 
in the means for each of these comparisons. 
In  neither  of  these  comparisons  does  the 
confidence  interval  on  the  estimate  of  the 
true differences include 0. 
A second qualitative prediction of the sub- 
game-perfect  equilibrium  theory  is  that, 
holding  discount  factors constant,  the pro- 
posal made to player 2 in the three-period 
game should be less than the proposal  made 
in the two-period  game.  Table 3 presents  the 
relevant across-column  comparisons.  In two 
of the four comparisons  the observed  differ- 
ence in means is in the opposite  direction  to 
that implied by the subgame-perfect  equilib- 
rium hypothesis. In the other two compar- 
isons, the t-ratios are high enough to reject 
the null hypothesis of no difference  in the 
means at the 95 percent  confidence  level but 
not at the 97.5 percent  confidence  level. 
Another indication of the lack of success 
of the subgame-perfect  equilibrium  hypothe- 
sis is the fact that Player  2 was only slightly 
more likely to receive  an opening  offer  for at 
least 50 percent  of the available  cash in cells 
3 and 4, where the equilibrium  offer  is for 60 
percent  of  the cash than in cells 1 and 2, 
where  the  equilibrium  offer  is  40  percent. 
Cells 3 and 4 contain 23.7 percent  of all of 
the subjects and only 25.3 percent  of all of 
the opening offers to player  2 which are for 
50 percent  (or more) of the available  cash. 
The subgame-perfect  equilibrium  predicts 
a qualitative  difference  in means in 25-pair- 
wise comparisons  across the cells in our ex- 
periment.  (See Table 4). A very weak test of 
the power of the theory to account for the 
qualitative  properties  of the data is whether 
the success rate in predicting  the observed 
direction of  differences  in round 10 mean 
offers is better than could be expected by 
predictions  made on the basis of coin flips. 
As  Table 4  indicates, the direction of  the 
difference  in means corresponds  to the theo- 
retically predicted  direction  in 17 of the 25 
pairwise comparisons. The  probability of 
getting at least 17 out of 25 answers  correct 
purely by chance is approximately  4.6 per- 
cent. Therefore,  we can  just barely  reject  the 
null hypothesis that, as a predictor  of  the 
direction of differences  in pairwise  compar- 
isons of means, the theory does no better 
than coin flipping. 
A  slightly more demanding test of  the 
ability of the theory to account  for qualita- 
tive properties  of the data is provided  by a 
test of the correlation  between  the observed 
round 10 mean opening offers and the per- 
fect equilibrium  offers  over the 8 cells of our 
experiment.  Equation  (1) reDorts  the regres- 362  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  JUNE  1989 
sion  estimate  of  the  relation  between  ob- 
served mean  opening  offers in  round 10 of 
each  cell  and  the  corresponding theoretical 
prediction. The value of the coefficient of the 
theoretical  mean is not  significantly greater 
than  zero  at  conventional  levels  of  signifi- 
cance. 
(1)  Observed Mean = 13.944 
-  .04306 Theoretical Mean 
(Std. Error=.066485).  R2=.06535. 
In testing the predictive power of the sub- 
game-perfect equilibrium theory we have fo- 
cused  upon  the  round  10  data  since  this 
represents  the  outcomes  of  bargaining be- 
tween  the most  experienced subjects. While 
experience makes some difference, as Figures 
IA,  B show, at the aggregate level round 10 
is not very different from other rounds. 
Table 5 presents the observed difference in 
the means of  the opening offers to Player 2 
between  round  1 and round 10 for each of 
the eight cells in the experiment. As the table 
shows,  at  the  aggregate  level  there  is  no 
statistically  significant  difference  in  offers 
between  rounds  1 and  10 in  any cell  other 
than cell 4. 
(ii)  Rejected  Opening Offers.  So  far  we 
have concentrated on first-period offers. The 
equilibrium prediction is that the first-period 
offers  will  be  accepted.  However, our  sub- 
jects  failed  to  reach agreement in  the  first 
period in 16 percent (125 out of 760) of the 
bargaining  rounds  of  the  experiment.  As 
Figures 1A, 1B show, even in the tenth round, 
13 percent (10 of 76) of the first-period offers 
were rejected. 
The  equilibrium  prediction  is  that  if  a 
proposal is rejected by Player 2, then Player 
2 will make a counterproposal that is at least 
as  advantageous  to  himself as the proposal 
he just rejected. If the utility of a proposal is 
determined (only) by its cash value, then the 
observed  pattern of  counterproposals is  in- 
consistent  with the above prediction. In  101 
of the 125 counterproposals offered by Player 
2 (81 percent), less cash was demanded than 
had been offered by Player 1 in the rejected 
initial  proposal.  Figures 2A-2H  display the 
distribution of first-period offers to Player 2, 
the  distribution  of  offers  which  were  re- 
jected,  and  the  distribution of  the  rejected 
offers which were followed by a disadvanta- 
geous  counterproposal, that is, one in which 
player 2's counterproposal would give him a 
smaller  monetary  payoff  than the  proposal 
he had just rejected. 
Note  that, after player 1 has made a pro- 
posal,  player  2  is  faced  with  an  individual 
choice  problem.  He  may  accept  player  l's 
offer, in which  case his payoff is certain, or 
he may reject it and make a counterproposal. 
If he chooses  to reject and make a counter- 
proposal, his payoff is uncertain, but will be 
at most  the amount he demands for himself 
in  his  counterproposal.  So  when  player  2 
rejects player l's  offer and makes the kind of 
disadvantageous counterproposal we observe 
so  frequently,  we  know by  revealed prefer- 
ence  that player 2's utility is  not  measured 
by  his  monetary  payoff.  So  the  high  fre- 
quency of disadvantageous counterproposals 
makes it inappropriate to continue to inter- 
pret the monetary payoffs to the bargainers 
as being equivalent to their utility payoffs. 
The pattern of  rejections and counterpro- 
posals  observed  in  this experiment is  quite 
similar to those in the previous experiments 
discussed  above.  Table  6  tabulates the  fre- 
quency  with  which  first offers are rejected, 
and  the  percentage  of  rejections  that  are 
disadvantageous in monetary terms, for each 
of  these experiments.10 In these dimensions, 
10These  data  were not  formally analyzed in  the re- 
ports of the previous experiments, but are derived from 
tables of the unaggregated data presented in Guth et al. 
(1982)  and  Neelin  et  al.  (1988),  and  in  the  working 
paper  version  of  Binmore  et  al.  (1984).  We  take  the 
opportunity  to  note  what  a  useful  practice  it  is  to 
include tables of unaggregated data in reports of experi- 
mental  work,  since  it  permits  other  investigators  to 
analyze  the data from different perspectives. And there 
is a special place in heaven for journals that allow such 
tables  to  be  published.  (The  unaggregated data  for 
rounds one  and  ten of  each cell of  the present experi- 
ment  are presented  in Table 9 at the end of  the text). 
The  full  data  set  is  available  from  the  authors upon 
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OPENING  OFFERS TO PLAYER 2 
CELL ONE  CELL FIVE 
(O1,  62)  (4,  .4)  Opening  Offers  (61, 62) =(4,  .4)  Opening  Offers 
19.??  T=2  per Round  =10  $19.00 
- 
T=3  per Round  =10 
18.00  -  18.00  _ 
17.00  -  17.00  - 
16.00  -  16.00  - 
15.00  ------'--r--r-  --------  r  ---  15.00 
13.(00~  <  -  L  1300  . 
1400  14L00 
1100  13100 
12000  1.000 
9.00  _  -.  9  LJ  LJ  Li  00i 
8.00  -  8.00  _ 
7.00  -  7.00  -  __ 
6.00  -  6.00  - 
5.00  -  5.00  - 
$4.00  -  $4.00  - 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  -  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
Round  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Round  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Rejected  Rejected 
Offers  (1)  (1)  (1)  (1)  (2)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (2)  (2)  Offers  (1)  (1)  (2)  (0)  (1)  (0)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (3) 
CELL TWO  CELL SIX 
(6.1 62) = (6,  .4)  Opening  Offers  (61, 62) = ( 6,  .4)  Opening  Offers 
$19.00  -  T=2  per Round  =10  $19.00  T=3  per Round  =10 
18.00  -  18.00  - 
17.00  -  17.00  - 
16.00  -  16.00  - 
19.00  -  _-  15.00 
14.00  -  14.00 
13.00  _L  13.00 
12.00  12.00  _L  i 
11.00  11.00  L 
10.00  10.00 
9.00  i i  9.00 
8.00  -8.00  L 
7.00  -7.00- 
6.00  -  6.00  - 
5.00  -  5.00  - 
$4.00  $4.00  193.00 
Round  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Round  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Rejected  Rejected 
Offers  (2)  (3)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (1)  (0)  (1)  (1)  Offers  (2)  (2)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (1)  (1)  (2)  (0) 
Legend:  r,  maximum observed  offer  -----------  equal  division 
T  mean  plus 2 standard  errors 
mean  observed  offer  perfect  equilibrium offer 
mean  minus 2 standard  errors 
L  minimum observed  offer  \  perfect  equilibrium interval 
FIGURE  IA.  OPENING  OFFERS  TO PLAYER  2 FOR CELLS  ONE,  TwO,  FIVE, 
AND SIX 
quite a striking similarity is revealed among 
this whole series of experiments. These simi- 
larities are even more striking in view of the 
differences reported in other aspects of these 
experiments,  (and  in  view  of  the  different 
numbers of observations in each experiment). 
The  percentage  of  first-offer rejections  for 
the  multi-period  experiments  of  Binmore 
et  al., Neelin  et al., and the present experi- 
ment  are  15  percent,  14  percent,  and  16 
percent, respectively, while the percentage of 
these rejections that were followed by disad- 364  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  JUNE  1989 
OPENING  OFFERS TO PLAYER 2 
CELL  THREE  CELL  SEVEN 
(61, 62)  (.6.  *6)  Opening  Offers  (51, 62)=(.6,  .6)  Opening  Offers 
$19.00  T=2  per Round  -8  $19.00  T=3  per Round  =9 
18.00  18.00  -  T'24.00 
17.00  17.00  - 
16.00  16.00  - 
15.00  15.00- 
14.00  14.00  - 
13.00  -'u  13.00 
12.00  Lu  u  uL  l  Lul12.00  -  - 
L 
11.00  11.00  _  I 
10.00  10.00  _ 
9.00  _  9.00  _  _ 
8.00  8.00 
7.00  -  7.00  .- 
6.00  -  6.00 
5.00  _  5.00 
$4.00  -  $4.00 
Round  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Round  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Rejected  Rejected 
Offers  (1)  (2)  (3)  (2)  (2)  (0)  (2)  (2)  (1)  (0)  Offers  (1)  (1)  (1)  (2)  (2)  (1)  (1)  (1)  (2)  (1) 
CELL  FOUR  CELL  EIGHT 
(  1  62)  (A.  .6)  Opening  Offers  (61, 62)(.4,  .6)  Opening  Offers 
$19.00  T=2  per Round  =10  $19.00  T,3  per Round  =9 
18.00  18.00  _ 
17.00  17.00  - 
16.00  16.00  - 
14.00  15.00 
13.00  13.00  i--u  Lu  u  L 
12.00  12.00  -  Li  Li 
1  1  .00  Lu  1  1  .00  Li 
10.00  _  LJ  10.00  _ 
9.00  _  u  9.00  _lJ 
8.00  18.00 
7.00  _  7.00 
6.00  6.00 
5.00  5.00 
$4.00  $4.00 
Round  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Round  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Rejected  Rejected 
Offers  (0)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (2)  (1)  (2)  Offers  (3)  (4)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (3)  (1)  (1) 
Legend:  maximum observed  offer  -----------  equal  division 
.  mean  plus 2  standard  errors 
mean  observed  offer  perfect  equilibrium offer 
mean  minus 2  standard  errors 
*  minimum observed  offer  \  perfect  equilibrium interval 
FIGURE  1B.  OPENING  OFFERS  TO  PLAYER  2 FOR  CELLS  THREE,  FOUR,  SEVENr 
AND EIGHT 
vantageous  counterproposals  are 75 percent, 
65  percent, and  81  percent, respectively. 
These are quite close to the corresponding 
figures for  the ultimatum games of  Guth 
et al. (1982), where 19 percent  of first offers 
are rejected, 88 percent disadvantageously. 
(These latter  figures  are  not fully comparable 
to those of the multi-period  games, since in 
an ultimatum  game any first-offer  rejection 
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TABLE  2-COMPARISONS  ACROSS  2-PERIOD  CELLS  WITH  COMMON  DISCOUNT 
FACTORS  (ROUND  10) 
95  Percent 
Degrees  of  Confidence 
Cell  A -Cell  B  XA -  XB  XA -  XB  Freedom  Limits 
1-2  -2.31  .6488  16  -3.685  <  l -  t2  < -  .935 
3-4  1.23  .4639  12  .22 < t3  -  1L4  < 2.24 
EX-XB  NA  NB  (S~  22  S2  2  NA  J  B) 
NA-  NB-  1 
TABLE  3-DIFFERENCES  ACROSS  COLUMNS  IN  MEAN  OPENING  OFFERS 
TO PLAYER  2 (ROUND  10) 
Degrees of 
Cell A -Cell  B  A-  XB  t-ratio  Freedom  =05 
Cell i-Cell  5  -.78  -1.173  18  1.734 
Cell 2-Cell  6  1.17  2.027  18  1.734 
Cell 3-Cell  7  1.0  1.917  10  1.812 
Cell 4-Cell  8  -.76  -1.540  14  1.761 
XA  -  XB  -2  2-2] 
I  SA  SB  l/ S2 \12 
S  S2 
NA  NB  NA/  \  NBJ 
NA-1  NB-  1 
tions of strictly positive offers are disadvan- 
tageous in monetary terms).11 
So  in  these  previous experiments, as well 
as in  the present one, the monetary payoffs 
do  not  capture the utility of the bargainers. 
We  shall argue in Section V that the unob- 
served  element  in  the  bargainers'  utility 
function  may  have  a component  related to 
the perceived "fairness" of a proposal. 
B.  Behavior in the Subgames 
When a first-period offer was rejected, the 
players  entered  a  subgame. There were 65 
observations  of two-period subgames, corre- 
sponding to the 65 rejected first-period offers 
in the three-period games of cells 5-8.  Table 
7  presents  information  on  the  pattern  of 
offers and responses in these subgames. 
"The  data  from  Gilth  and  Teitz  (1987)  are  not 
included  in  the  table  because  it  was  incomparable in 
another way: recall from the description of that experi- 
ment  that  disadvantageous  counterproposals were ex- 
pressly  forbidden  by  the rules of  the game. Neverthe- 
less,  out  of 42  observations, 17 first-period offers were 
refused  (40  percent),  of  which  6  (35  percent)  were 
disadvantageous  counterproposals,  in spite of  the rule 
that  such  counterproposals  would  not  be  acted upon, 
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TABLE  4-HYPOTHESIZED  VS.  OBSERVED  DIFFERENCES 
IN  OPENING  OFFERS  TO PLAYER  2 (ROUND  10) 
Observed  Agreement in 
Hypothesis  Difference  Direction 
yl  = y2a  -2.31  - 
Al <  A3  -  2.66  Yes 
Al <  A4  --1.44  Yes 
Al >  P5  -.78  No 
Al >  6  --1.14  No 
Al > P7  -1.67  No 
tL1 >  A8  -2.20  No 
A2  <  A3  --.36  Yes 
A2  <  A4  .87  No 
P-2>P-5  1.53  Yes 
P2 >  P6  1.17  Yes 
A2  >  /7  1.17  Yes 
A2  >  A8  .11  Yes 
A3 =  A4  1.23  _ 
A3 >  A5  1.89  Yes 
A3  >  A6  1.53  Yes 
A3 >  A7  1.00  Yes 
A3 >  P8  .47  Yes 
A4  >  /5  .66  Yes 
A4  > /6  .30  Yes 
A4  >  A7  -*.23  No 
A4  >  A8  --.76  No 
A5 >  A6  -.36  No 
tL  5  -= tL  7  -.87  _ 
A5  <  A8  --1.42  Yes 
A6  <  P7  -.53  Yes 
A6  <  A8  -  1.06  Yes 
A7  <  P8  -.53  Yes 
a/1i  =  predicted  (perfect  equilibrium)  offer  in  cell  i. 
TABLE  5-DIFFERENCES  IN  ROUND  1 AND 
ROUND  10  OPENING  OFFERS  BY  CELL 
Cell  xl  -  xio  s  -3 0  t-ratio  ta05 
One  1.14  .6248  1.825  2.262 
Two  .39  .3178  1.227  2.262 
Three  -  .825  .413  -1.996  2.365 
Four  1.12  .463  2.419  2.262 
Five  .21  .637  .330  2.262 
Six  .87  .831  1.047  2.262 
Seven  .223  .706  .330  2.306 
Eight  -.33  .653  .505  2.306 
sI  +SO  e  -  X=  2  2  X  -  Xio 
N  ax-  ~ 
Opening  Offers  and  Responses 
40- 
3  Offers  9  3  Rejected  Offers  3  Disadvantageous  Counters 
FIGURE  2A.  OPENING OFFERS  AND RESPONSES 
FOR CELL  ONE 
Opening Offers and Responses 
30 
<lops 
|z3Offes  93Rejected  Offers  g:Disadvantageous  Counters 
FIGURE 2B.  OPENING OFFERS  AND RESPONSES 
FOR CELL TwO 
Note  first that 24 of the 65 opening offers 
in these subgames were rejected and that in 
16  (67  percent)  of  these  cases  player  I's 
subsequent  cash  demand was  for  less  than 
the amount the player had just rejected. Sec- 
ond,  like  the  observed  first-period  offers, 
these  offers  reflect  a  perceived  first-mover 
advantage in  that the maximum offer made 
by player 2 (the period 2 proposer) to player 
I  never  exceeded  an equal division of  cash 
offer even though in two of these four cases 
the  perfect  equilibrium  offer  exceeded  the 
equal division offer. Third, in Cells Five and 
Eight, where the perfect equilibrium offer is 
less than the equal division offer, the average 
offer is  above  the perfect equilibrium offer. 
Conversely,  in  Cells  Six  and  Seven,  where 
the  perfect  equilibrium  offer  is  above  the VOL. 79  NO. 3  OCHS AND ROTH: STUDY OF SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING  367 
Opening  Offers  and  Responses 
Cell  Three 
34  - 
2816 
24  -  d  W 
<-30  31-35  36-39  40  41-45  46-49  50 
ZaOffers  ERejected  Offers  m  Disad6anwageous  Counters 
FIGURE  2D.  OPENING OFFERS  AND RESPONSES 
FOR CELL THREE 
Opening Offers and  Responses 
20  -  10-<  ,i 
6  ~ ~  ~ ~ ~ ~~~Cr 
<3  3135  36-39  40  41-45  4649  50-5 
Chips 
Offers  Rejected Offers  Disadvantageous Counters 
FIGuRE 2E.  OPENING OFFERS  AND RESPONSES 
FOR CELL  FIVE 
Openinq  Offers  and  Responses 
Cell  Feven 
30  35  3-9  4  145  4-9  5  5 
e  gOffers  Rejected Offers  3  Disadvantageous  Counters 
FIGURE 2G.  OPENING OFFERS  AND RESPONSES 
FOR CELL SEVEN 
Opening  Offers  and  Responses 
Cell  Fr.,u 
45~~~~~~~~~~5p 
35-  LXX 
40  414-6-95 
<:hips 
7/3  Offers  Ng3  Rejected  Offers  Disadvantageous  Counters 
FIGuRE 2C.  OPENING OFFERS  AND RESPONSES 
FOR  CELL FOUR 
Opening  Offers  and  Responses 
35 
<0  _3  5-  0  414  64  05 
;2Offers  g:RejectedOfr  3  Disadvantagcous Counters 
FIGURE  2F.  OPENING OFFERS  AND RESPONSES 
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Opening Offers and  Responses 
20  40  4-4  45  4-9  5 
E  Ofers  23  Rjeced  Ofers  3  Dsadvai:ageous  Counters 
FIGRE H.  PENNGOFFERS  AND RESPONSES 
FOR CELL  EIGHT 368  THE AMEPJCAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  JUNE  1989 
TABLE  6-FIRST-OFFER  REJECTIONS  AND  DISADVANTAGEOUS  COUNTERPROPOSALS 
First-Offer  Disadvantageous 
Observations  Rejections  Counterproposals 
125  101 
Ochs and Roth  760  (60  16 percent  125)81  percent 
Binmore, Shaked, 
and Sutton 
Game 1  81  (-8l) 15 percent  (-2)  75 percent 
Game 2  NA` 
Neelin,  Sonnenschein, 
and Spiegel 
I16\9 
Experiment 1  120  (  120)  13 percent  -y6) 56 percent 
Experiment 2  45  (  ) 16 percent  ( -) 86 percent 
Experiments  l and 2  165  (li5)  14 percent  (-s) 65 percent 
Giuth, Schmittberger, 
and Schwarz, 1982 
(Ultimatum Games)  b 
"Naive"  21  (A-)  10 percent  (-)  50 percent 
"Experienced"  21  (A-)  29 percent  ( -) 100  percent 
Naive and  Experienced  42  (  ) 19 percent  (-8 )  88 percent 
a There was no second player in this game. 
bOne of the rejections was of a (100,0) division, so the rejection was not disadvanta- 
geous. 
TABLE  7-Two-PEIUOD  SUBGAMES 
Cell Five  Cell Six  Cell Seven  Cell Eight 
No.  of 2-Period Subgames  12  14  13  26 
No.  of Rejected Opening Offers  2  6  7  9 
No. of Disadvantageous Counteroffers  2  3  3  8 
Minimum Opening Offer  $4.80  $3.60  $2.88  $3.60 
Maximum Opening Offer  $6.00  $7.20  $8.01  $7.20 
Average Opening Offer  $5.50  $6.146  $6.065  $5.88 
Variance of Opening Offers  $0.1868  $0.9575  $4.5329  $1.057 
Minimum Accepted Offer  $4.80  $5.94  $6.30  $4.56 
Perfect Equilibrium Offer  $5.04  $11.16  $11.16  $5.04 
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TABLE 8-ULTIMATUM  SUBGAMES 
Cell 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
No. of Games  10  15  15  20  2  6  7  9 
No.  End in Disagreement  7  7  6  6  1  4  4  4 
No.  End in Agreement  3  8  9  14  1  2  3  5 
Minimum Offer  .12  .18  3.60  3.60  1.00  0  1.10  2.20 
Maximum Offer  6.00  9.00  9.00  7.20  2.50  3.45  5.50  4.40 
Average Offer  2.844  5.184  7.14  5.556  1.75  1.025  4.02  3.434 
Variance in Offers  4.335  5.759  3.264  .664  .5625  1.544  3.014  .319 
Minimum Accepted Offer  4.20  5.04  4.50  4.80  2.50  3.45  4.40  3.30 
Equal Division Offer  6.00  7.20  9.00  7.20  2.50  3.41-3.45  5.50  3.41-3.45 
TABLE  9-UNAGGREGATED  DATA FOR 
ROUNDS ONE AND TEN 
idr  = identification  #  of Player I; 
idl  = identification  #  of Player II; 
pl.  ro=  period-one demand of player I, in cash; 
pl.  lc=period-one  offer to player II, in cash; 
pl.  a =  "a" if period-one offer is accepted;  ="r"  if rejected; 
p2. rc  period-two offer to player I, in cash; 
p2. lc= period-two demand by player II, in cash; 
p2. a=" a" if period-two offer is accepted;  = "r" if rejected; 
= "d" if period-one offer was accepted; 
p3. re= period-three demand of player I, in cash; 
p3. lc=period-three  offer to player II, in cash; 
p3. a="  a" if period-three offer is accepted;  = "r" if rejected; 
= "d" if an earlier period proposal was accepted. 
Cell One, Player I's Discount Factor =.4, 
Player II's Discount  Factor =.4,  Two Periods 
Round 1 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl. lc  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2.1c  p2. a 
0  9  15.  15.  a  d 
1  8  17.7  12.3  a  d 
2  7  15.  15.  a  d 
3  6  18.  12.  a  d 
4  5  15.  15.  a  d 
5  4  18.  12.  a  d 
6  3  18.  12.  a  d 
7  2  18.  12.  a  d 
8  1  17.1  12.9  r  6.  6.  a 
9  0  16.5  13.5  a  d 
Round 10 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl. lc  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2.1c  p2. a 
0  8  19.5  10.5  a  d 
1  7  17.7  12.3  a  d 
2  6  18.  12.  r  3.6  8.4  r 
3  5  21.  9.  r  1.2  10.8  r 
4  4  15.  15.  a  d 
5  3  18.  12.  a  d 
6  2  18.  12.  a  d 
7  1  18.  12.  a  d 
8  0  16.5  13.5  a  d 
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TABLE  9-CONTINUED 
Cell Two, Player I's Discount Factor =.6, 
Player II's Discount  Factor =.4,  Two Periods 
Round 1 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl.  Ic  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2.1c  p2. a 
O  0  16.8  13.2  a  d 
1  9  15.  15.  a  d 
2  8  15.  15.  r  5.4  8.4  a 
3  7  14.1  15.9  a  d 
4  6  15.  15.  a  d 
5  5  15.  15.  a  d 
6  4  15.  15.  a  d 
7  3  15.3  14.7  a  d 
8  2  15.  15.  a  d 
9  1  16.5  13.5  r  9.  6.  a 
Round 10 
idr  idl  pi.  rc  pl.  lc  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2. Ic  p2. a 
0  9  15.  15.  a  d 
1  8  15.  15.  a  d 
2  7  15.  15.  a  d 
3  6  17.7  12.3  a  d 
4  5  15.  15.  a  d 
5  4  18.  12.  r  7.2  7.2  a 
6  3  15.  15.  a  d 
7  2  14.4  15.6  a  d 
8  1  15.  15.  a  d 
9  0  16.5  13.5  a  d 
Cell 3, Player I's Discount Factor =.6, 
Player II's Discount  Factor =.6,  Two Periods 
Round 1 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl.  lc  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2. Ic  p2. a 
0  7  15.  15.  a  d 
1  6  15.  15.  a  d 
2  5  15.9  14.1  a  d 
3  4  17.1  12.9  a  d 
4  3  15.  15.  a  d 
5  2  16.5  13.5  a  d 
6  1  18.  12.  r  9.  9.  a 
7  0  16.5  13.5  a  d 
Round 10 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl.  lc  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2. Ic  p2. a 
0  6  15.  15.  a  d 
1  5  15.  15.  a  d 
2  4  15.  15.  a  d 
3  3  15.9  14.1  a  d 
4  2  15.  15.  a  d 
5  1  15.  15.  a  d 
6  0  15.  15.  a  d 
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TABLE  9-CONTINUED 
Cell 4, Player I's Discount Factor =.4, 
Player II's Discount  Factor =.6,  Two Periods 
Round 1 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl. Ic  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2.1c  p2.a 
0  9  15.  15.  a  d 
1  8  16.5  13.5  a  d 
2  7  15.  15.  a  d 
3  6  15.  15.  a  d 
4  5  15.  15.  a  d 
5  4  15.  15.  a  d 
6  3  16.5  13.5  a  d 
7  2  15.  15.  a  d 
8  1  15.  15.  a  d 
9  0  15.3  14.7  a  d 
Round 10 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl. Ic  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2.1c  p2. a 
0  8  15.9  14.1  a  d 
1  7  16.5  13.5  a  d 
2  6  18.  12.  r  4.8  10.8  r 
3  5  15.3  14.7  a  d 
4  4  15.9  14.1  a  d 
5  3  15.  15.  a  d 
6  2  18.3  11.7  a  d 
7  1  16.5  13.5  a  d 
8  0  15.  15.  a  d 
9  9  18.9  11.1  r  6.  9.  a 
Cell 5, Player I's Discount Factor =.4, 
Player II's Discount  Factor =.4,  Three Periods 
Round 1 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl.  lc  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2. Ic  p2. a  p3. rc  p3. Ic  p3. a 
0  9  17.4  12.6  r  5.76  6.24  a  d 
1  8  18.  12.  a  d  d 
2  7  17.7  12.3  a  d  d 
3  6  18.  12.  a  d  d 
4  5  18.  12.  a  d  d 
5  4  14.7  15.3  a  d  d 
6  3  15.  15.  a  d  d 
7  2  18.  12.  a  d  d 
8  1  15.  15.  a  d  d 
9  0  18.  12.  a  d  d 
Round 10 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl.  lc  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2. Ic  p2. a  p3. rc  p3. Ic  p3. a 
0  8  17.7  12.3  a  d  d 
1  7  18.  12.  a  d  d 
2  6  18.9  11.1  r  6.  6.  a  d 
3  5  18.  12.  a  d  d 
4  4  18.3  11.7  r  5.04  6.96  a  d 
5  3  14.7  15.3  a  d  d 
6  2  15.3  14.7  a  d  d 
7  1  18.  12.  a  d  d 
8  0  15.  15.  a  d  d 
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TABLE  9-CONTINUED 
Cell 6, Player I's Discount Factor =.6, 
Player II's Discount  Factor =.4,  Three Periods 
Round 1 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl.Ic  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2.1c  p2. a  p3. rc  p3.1c  p3. a 
0  9  16.5  13.5  r  6.3  7.8  a  d 
1  8  15.  15.  a  d  d 
2  7  15.  15.  a  d  d 
3  6  15.  15.  a  d  d 
4  5  15.9  14.1  a  d  d 
5  4  15.  15.  a  d  d 
6  3  14.7  15.3  a  d  d 
7  2  15.  15.  a  d  d 
8  1  15.  15.  a  d  d 
9  0  22.5  7.5  r  3.6  9.6  r  6.05  2.25  r 
Round 10 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl.lc  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2. lc  p2. a  p3. rc  p3.1c  p3. a 
0  8  16.5  13.5  a  d  d 
1  7  16.5  13.5  a  d  d 
2  6  15.  15.  a  d  d 
3  5  19.5  10.5  a  d  d 
4  4  17.4  12.6  a  d  d 
5  3  16.2  13.8  a  d  d 
6  2  14.7  15.3  a  d  d 
7  1  18.  12.  a  d  d 
8  0  16.5  13.5  a  d  d 
9  9  18.  12.  a  d  d 
Cell 7, Player I's Discount Factor =  .6, 
Player II's Discount  Factor =.6,  Three Periods 
Round 1 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl.lc  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2.1c  p2. a  p3. rc  p3.1c  p3. a 
0  8  15.  15.  a  d  d 
1  7  15.  15.  a  d  d 
2  6  15.  15.  a  d  d 
3  5  15.9  14.1  a  d  d 
4  4  18.  12.  a  d  d 
5  3  16.2  13.8  a  d  d 
6  2  15.  15.  a  d  d 
7  1  15.  15.  a  d  d 
8  0  19.5  10.5  r  6.3  11.7  a  d 
Round 10 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl.lc  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2. lc  p2. a  p3. rc  p3.1c  p3. a 
0  7  15.  15.  a  d  d 
1  6  15.  15.  a  d  d 
2  5  15.  15.  a  d  d 
3  4  17.7  12.3  a  d  d 
4  3  18.  12.  r  8.1  9.9  a  d 
5  2  18.  12.  a  d  d 
6  1  15.  15.  a  d  d 
7  0  15.  15.  a  d  d 
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TABLE  9-CONTINUED 
Cell 8, Player I's Discount  Factor =.4, 
Player II's Discount  Factor =.6,  Three Periods 
Round  1 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl.  lc  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2. Ic  p2. a  p3. rc  p3. Ic  p3. a 
0  8  15.  15.  a  d  d 
1  7  17.4  12.6  a  d  d 
2  6  21.  9.  r  6.  9.  a  d 
3  5  15.  15.  a  d  d 
4  4  15.  15.  a  d  d 
5  3  15.  15.  a  d  d 
6  2  16.5  13.5  r  4.8  10.8  r  3.5  3.3  r 
7  1  15.  15.  r  5.76  9.36  a  d 
8  0  15.  15.  a  d  d 
Round 10 
idr  idl  pl.  rc  pl. lc  pl.  a  p2. rc  p2.1c  p2. a  p3. rc  p3.1c  p3. a 
0  7  15.  15.  a  d  d 
1  6  15.9  14.1  a  d  d 
2  5  17.1  12.9  r  4.56  11.16  a  d 
3  4  15.9  14.1  a  d  d 
4  3  15.  15.  a  d  d 
5  2  15.  15.  a  d  d 
6  1  16.5  13.5  a  d  d 
7  0  16.5  13.5  a  d  d 
8  8  15.  15.  a  d  d 
idr  = identification  #  of Player I; 
idl  = identification  #  of Player II; 
pl.  rc=period-one  demand of player I, in cash; 
pl.  lc=period-one  offer to player II, in cash; 
pl.  a = "a" if period-one offer is accepted;  ="r"  if rejected; 
p2. rc= period-two offer to player I, in cash; 
p2. lc= period-two demand by player II, in cash; 
p2. a = "a" if period-two offer is accepted;  = "r" if rejected; 
=-"d"  if period-one offer was accepted; 
p3. rc= period-three demand of player I, in cash; 
p3. lc= period-three offer to player II, in cash; 
p3. a = "a" if period-three offer is accepted;  = "r" if rejected; 
=-"d"  if an earlier period proposal was accepted. 
equal division  offer, the average offer is be- 
low the perfect equilibrium offer (and below 
the equal division offer). Therefore, as in the 
case  of  the  observed  first-period offers, the 
deviation  of  the average offer from the per- 
fect equilibrium offer is always in the direc- 
tion  of  equal  division.  Fourth,  minimally 
acceptable  offers tended to be positively re- 
lated to the cash value of the equal division 
of cash offer. 
In Cells  One  through Four, games which 
did  not  reach agreement in  the first period 
continued  into  an  ultimatum  (one-period) 
subgame.  There were 60  such games which 
entered  into  an  ultimatum  stage.  In  Cells 
Five through Eight, 24 games failed to reach 
agreement  by  the  end  of  period  two  and 
entered into an ultimatum subgame. Table 8 
displays  the  data  for  these ultimatum sub- 
games. Notice  that 38 of these 84 ultimatum 
subgames  ended  in  disagreement. Both  the 
average offer made  and the minimum offer 
accepted  in  these  subgames is  consistently 
below the offer that represents an equal divi- 
sion  of  the  cash  between  players  1 and  2. 
Furthermore,  in  Cells  Five  through  Eight, 
where  the  total  amount of  cash potentially 
available  to  be  divided  was  the  smallest, 
tolerable deviations (i.e., those that were ac- 
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C.  Other Observed  Regularities 
In  addition  to  these results which are at 
odds  with  the  subgame-perfect equilibrium 
prediction,  there  are several regularities in 
the data to which we call the reader's atten- 
tion. 
In six of  the eight cells in the experiment 
at  least  half  of  the  first round  period-one 
offers to Player 2 were for between 45 and 50 
percent of the available cash. Experience did 
not  significantly  diminish  the  incidence  of 
50-50  offers. In round ten, at least 50 per- 
cent of the opening offers to Player 2 fell in 
this  range  for  the  same  six  cells.  Further- 
more,  in  four  of  these  six  cells  there were 
always at least half of the first-period offers 
in  this  range.  And  in  all  but  Cell  2,  the 
maximum  offer  in  each  round  was  almost 
always very close  to equal division (see Fig- 
ures 1A,1B). 
Three  main  types  of  individual behavior 
over rounds are reflected in the data. There 
is  one  type  of  player  1  who  never offers 
player 2 less than 50 percent of the chips in 
period  one.  Sixteen  of  the  76  subjects (21 
percent) who had the role of player 1 in our 
experiment  behaved  in  this way.  A  second 
type of  behavior is of the variety where the 
period-one  offer made to player 2 in round 
one  is  not  the  smallest  opening  offer ever 
made  and where the opening offer made in 
round t + 1 is never greater than the opening 
offer  made  in  round  t  unless  the  round  t 
opening  offer was rejected. Twenty-eight of 
the  individuals  (36.8  percent  of  the  total) 
who  had  the role of  player 1 exhibited this 
type  of  behavior.  The  third main  type  of 
behavior  is  characterized  by  making  a 
round-one  opening  offer which  is  both  an 
offer of less than 50 percent of the chips and 
is also the smallest opening offer the individ- 
ual ever makes. There were 14 (18.4 percent 
of  all subjects) of  our subjects whose open- 
ing  offers  displayed  this  pattern. The  first 
type  of  behavior  has  no  apparent learning 
component  to it. The second type might be 
characterized  as  a  cautious  search  for  the 
lowest  acceptable  offer. The  third  type  of 
behavior is exhibited by individuals who are 
apparently optimistic at the outset that they 
can  exploit  what  they  believe  to  be  a 
" first-mover" advantage and either never in- 
crease their opening offer or who respond to 
rejection  by  increasing  their opening  offer. 
Because both type-two and type-three behav- 
ior  are  exhibited  in  the  same  groups,  the 
aggregate data (Table 5) mask the volume of 
adaptive behavior which was exhibited by a 
substantial proportion of the subjects in our 
experiment. 
Proposals  which  offered Player 2 at least 
50  percent  of  the available money  were al- 
most  never  rejected.  There  were  296  such 
proposals,  only  13  of  which  were  rejected. 
Player 2 was slightly more likely to reject an 
offer when  the  subgame-perfect equilibrium 
required that he get 60 percent of the avail- 
able  cash  than  when  the  equilibrium  re- 
quired that he get 40 percent or less. In cells 
3 and 4, 19.4 percent of the 180 offers made 
to  Player 2 were rejected while in the other 
cells  15.5 percent of  the 580 opening offers 
were rejected. 
It  was  not  profitable to  be  aggressive in 
making  counterproposals.  There  were  only 
20  counterproposals  in  which  Player 2  de- 
manded  at  least  $11.  Sixteen  of  these  20 
counterproposals  were rejected. Altogether, 
50  of  the  125  counterproposals  were  re- 
jected.  In only  12 of these rejected counter- 
proposals  was  Player  1  offered at  least  67 
percent  of  the  cash demanded by  Player 2. 
The  mean  cash  demand  of  Player  2  in 
the  rejected  counterproposals  was  $10.50 
while  the  mean  cash  demand  by  Player 2 
of  the  accepted  counterproposals was  only 
$8.44. 
Even  though  Player  1  had  a  theoretical 
strategic  advantage  in  all  cells  other  than 
cells  three and  four, aggressive exploitation 
of this advantage was not, in fact, profitable 
to Player 1. Figures 3A-3H  display the rela- 
tionship  between  Player  l's  average  cash 
earnings  per  round  and  the  average  cash 
value of his opening demands for each of the 
cells in the experiment. Notice  that in every 
cell  the highest  average earnings are associ- 
ated with an individual who made less than 
the  highest  cash  demands. In each cell,  the 
player with  the highest average opening de- 
mand  had average earnings below  the aver- 
age earnings for the cell as a whole. In four 
of the eight cells, the player with the highest 
average demand had the lowest average earn- 
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FIGuRE 3A. AVERAGE  E-ARNINGs/AvERAGE 
OPENING  DEMAND  FOR CELL  ONE 
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FIGURE 3C.  AVERAGE  EARNINGS/AVERAGE 
OPENING DEMAND FOR  CELL THREE 
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OPENING DEMAND FOR  CELL FIVEE 
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FIGURE 3E.  AVERAGE  EARNINGS/AVERAGE 
OPENING DEMAND  FOR  CELL FIVE 
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FIGURE 3B.  AVERAGE  EARNINGS/AVERAGE 
OPENING DEMAND  FOR  CELL  TwO 
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IV. Making  Sense of the Data 
The  high  frequency  of  disadvantageous 
counterproposals  makes clear that there are 
nonmonetary  arguments in  the  bargainers' 
utility functions. As this phenomenon seems 
to  occur in  the  data of  a variety of  experi- 
ments (Table 6), it merits serious attention. 
Of  course,  any  important  nonmonetary 
components  of  the bargainers' utility  func- 
tions  could  account  for  the  failure  of  the 
perfect  equilibrium  predictions,  since  these 
are  made  under  the  assumption  that  the 
bargainers'  utilities  are  identical  to  their 
monetary  payoffs.  (In  this  sense,  we  con- 
clude  that these experiments fail to test per- 
fect  equilibrium  per  se).  But  not  just  any 
nonmonetary  components could account for 
the  specific  regularities we  observe  in  our 
data. We turn now to consider what kinds of 
nonmonetary  arguments can  account  both 
for  the  failure  of  the  perfect  equilibrium 
predictions and for the observed regularities. 
At  this point  these considerations must nec- 
essarily be somewhat speculative, since these 
nonmonetary  arguments  are  neither  ob- 
served  nor  controlled  for in either these or 
the previous experiments. 
We will concentrate on five observed, un- 
predicted regularities (see Figures IA, B): 
1.  A  consistent  first-mover advantage 
was  observed  in  all the cells of  this experi- 
ment  (both  in  the  first period  and  in  the 
subgames). 
2.  The  discount  factor of  player 1 was 
observed  to  influence  the  outcome  even  in 
the two-period games. 
3.  A  substantial  percentage of  first of- 
fers were rejected. 
4. The observed mean agreements devi- 
ate  from  the  equilibrium predictions in  the 
direction of equal division. 
5.  A  substantial  percentage of  rejected 
offers  were  followed  by  disadvantageous 
counterproposals. 
A.  A (Too) Simple Model of Minimum 
Acceptance Thresholds 
We begin with a model simple enough to 
allow us to solve for perfect equilibria under 
alternative  assumptions  about  bargainers' 
utilities.  This will allow us to illustrate how 
nonmonetary  components  of utility can en- 
ter the model in a way that can account for 
the first three of  the above five unpredicted 
regularities. But the fourth and fifth regulari- 
ties  will  force  us  to  consider more compli- 
cated kinds of utility functions. 
The  motivation  is  the following.  Suppose 
agents  regard  some  offers  as  "insultingly 
low," and that there is a disutility to accept- 
ing such offers. This utility could take many 
forms,  but  for  simplicity  we  suppose  here 
that it takes the form of  a simple monetary 
threshold: each player i  has some threshold 
ti, in  dollars,  such that he will refuse offers 
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function is such that the disutility of accept- 
ing  a low  offer is greater than the utility of 
increasing his wealth by less than $ti. 
In this case, in contrast to the case when 
the  minimum  acceptable  offer  at  the  last 
period  is  taken  to  be  equal  to  the  $0  dis- 
agreement  payoff,  the  discount  factors  of 
both  bargainers  matter  even  in  2-period 
games. For example, when player 1 will not 
accept  less  than  $3.00,  the  perfect  equilib- 
rium payoff is ($15,$15)  in cell 3 (81 =.6,82 
=  .6), but is ($16.5,$13.5) in cell 4 (81 =A4 82 
=.6).12  These payoffs are rather close to the 
mean  observed  agreements in  round  10  of 
cells 3 and 4 (see Figures 1A, 1B.) 
Furthermore, minimum acceptance thres- 
holds of this magnitude are consistent with a 
first-mover advantage at perfect equilibrium 
in all eight cells of  this experiment. Finally, 
if bargainers' threshold levels are private in- 
formation, the bargainers are playing a game 
of  incomplete  information,  in  which  case 
theory is consistent  with the prediction that 
not  all  first-period  offers will  be  accepted 
(see,  for  example,  some  of  the  models  in 
Roth, 1985). 
So,  if  we  looked  only  at  the  first three 
observed regularities, we might hope that the 
uncontrolled  elements  in  the  utility  of  the 
players would  simply involve minimum ac- 
ceptance thresholds of this kind and magni- 
tude. But when we look at the last two of the 
above-mentioned  regularities, cells  1  and  2 
show that matters are not so simple. 
Consider cells 1 and 2, with discount fac- 
tors (81  =  4, 82 =  .4) and (81  = .6,  82 =  .4), re- 
spectively. When utility can be measured by 
the monetary payoff, the perfect equilibrium 
prediction is that player 2 will receive $12 in 
each cell, and in fact we observe (see Figures 
1A, B)  that  the  mean  first-period offer  to 
player 2 is greater than this in all rounds of 
cell  2, and in all rounds but round 5 of cell 
1. If player 1 will not accept less than $3.00, 
then  the perfect equilibrium predictions be- 
come ($21,$9)  for cell 1, and ($19.80,$10.20) 
for  cell  2.  While  this is consistent  with the 
observation that player 2 does better in cell 2 
than  in  cell  1,  these predictions are further 
from  equal  division  than  are the  standard 
equilibrium  predictions,  while  the  observed 
outcomes  were closer to equal division. 
So,  while  the  "minimum  acceptance 
threshold theory" of bargainers' utilities is at 
least roughly consistent with observations in 
six  of  the  eight  cells  of  this experiment, in 
two of the cells it fails to account for one of 
the  clear  regularities observed in  both  this 
experiment  and  many  earlier experiments, 
namely,  that  many  observed  offers  and 
agreements  are  approximately  equal  divi- 
sions."  And  in  all  of  the  cells  it  fails  to 
account for the high percentage of disadvan- 
tageous  counterproposals,  since  rejections 
caused  by  a  minimum  monetary  threshold 
would  always be  followed by a counterpro- 
posal  demanding  more  than  the  threshold. 
Thus, while there is a lot of intuitive plausi- 
bility  to the notion  that this kind of thresh- 
old  may play  some role in bargaining,'4 we 
are forced to conclude that it is not sufficient 
by itself to account for the observed regular- 
ities. 
So  we  might  speculate  that  the  uncon- 
trolled elements of utility include some com- 
ponent  that measures "unfairness" as devia- 
tions  from  equal  division,  for  example,  by 
imposing  a  minimum  acceptance  threshold 
which takes the form of a minimum percent- 
12The  computation works as follows. In cell 3, player 
l's  chips are worth $0.18 each in the second period, so 
in  the second  period player 2 must offer him 17 chips 
($3.06) to meet the minimal acceptable amount of $3.00, 
leaving 83 chips (worth $14.94) to player 2. So in period 
1, player 1 must offer player 2 50 chips, worth $15, in 
order to have him  accept rather than reject and go  to 
period 2. In cell 4, player l's chips are worth only $0.12 
in  the  second  period,  so  player  2  must  offer him  25 
chips ($3.00), leaving 75 chips (worth $13.50) to player 
2. So in the first period player 1 must offer player 2 45 
chips, worth $13.50. 
13It  could  of  course be argued that six out of  eight 
cells is not too bad, and that perhaps random variation 
accounted  for the fact that the observed outcomes devi- 
ated  from  the  direction  predicted  by  the  "minimum 
threshold  theory" in  two  cells. This argument fails  to 
take into  account  that the preponderance of equal and 
near equal divisions is one of the most consistent regu- 
larities in both this and previous experiments. 
14For  example, the back cover of the December 1986 
issue  of  the  Journal of Political Economy contained  a 
brief account of  an Israeli taxicab driver who, insulted 
by being offered an unexpectedly low fare at the end of 
an unmetered journey,  took his (economist) passengers 
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age of the available  commodities.  This  would 
hamper the ability of player 1 to fully ex- 
ploit  the  standard  perfect  equilibrium 
arithmetic,  not to mention the even larger 
first-mover  advantage  that appears  when a 
minimum acceptable  monetary  threshold  is 
introduced.  We consider below the consis- 
tency of such utility functions  with the data. 
B.  When Deviations  from 50 - 50 
Are Important 
Suppose players 2  would tolerate only 
some maximum  deviation  of an opening  offer 
from an equal division  of the available  cash. 
This threshold will vary across individuals 
and can be empirically  estimated  for those 
Player 2s whose maximum  rejected  opening 
offer is less than their respective  minimum 
accepted opening offer. There were 48 dif- 
ferent  Player  2 subjects  who rejected  at least 
one opening offer. Of this group  there  were 
35 for whom the lowest first  offer they ever 
accepted was no less than the highest first 
offer they ever rejected.  Suppose  we set the 
estimated "deviation  threshold"  for each of 
these individuals  to be the mean  of these  two 
numbers. The level of these thresholds  ap- 
pears to  have a  systematic effect on  the 
opening offers of experienced  subjects.  This 
is  reflected in  the regression  between the 
mean round-ten opening offers to Player  2 
across the cells of our experiment  and the 
median threshold levels across these cells. 
Equation  (2) presents  this regression. 
(2)  Observed  Mean  Offer 
= 3.378 
+ .8287  Median  Threshold 
R2=  .7126 (Std. Error  =.2148). 
Furthermore,  there is some evidence  that 
second-period  proposals  made by players  2 
who  rejected a  first-period  proposal were 
sensitive  to how "unfair"  the initial  proposal 
had been. If a proposal  which  contains  equal 
cash values for both players  is "fair,"  then 
Player  2 made counterproposals  that  were  as 
"unfair"  as the initial proposals  of Player  1. 
It is easy to verify  in addition  that the first 
four observed regularities  discussed above 
are all consistent with a  model in  which 
bargainers  reject  offers  that  deviate  too much 
from equal division,  as of course  is the addi- 
tional observed  regularity  regarding  the fre- 
quency of disadvantageous  counterproposals 
in this and previous  experiments  (Table  6). 
V. Conclusions 
Figures lA,lB  and Table 6 convey much 
of what  has been learned  here.  Figures  IA, 1B 
make clear that the subgame-perfect  equilib- 
rium predictions that come from assuming 
that players' monetary  payoffs are a good 
proxy for their utility payoffs  are not at all 
descriptive  of the results  we observed.  This is 
true not merely of the point predictions,  as 
has been observed by some of  the earlier 
experimenters  to investigate  this kind of bar- 
gaining, but also of the qualitative  predic- 
tions about how the results  in different  cells 
should  be related.  But there  is a great  deal of 
regularity  in the observed  behavior,  and in- 
deed there is much more similarity  among 
the observed  outcomes  in the eight  cells than 
there is  in  the perfect equilibrium  predic- 
tions for those cells. 
There is also a high frequency  of disad- 
vantageous  counterproposals  (Figure 2 and 
Tables 7 and 8), and Table  6 shows  that this 
is true of the previous  experiments  also. This 
previously  overlooked  feature  of the data is 
central to our conclusion  that the monetary 
payoffs are not a good proxy for players' 
utilities. We have shown how many of the 
observed  regularities  in the data can be rec- 
onciled with a  theory in which bargainers 
incorporate  distributional  concerns  (namely, 
comparisons  of how large a proportion  of 
the available  wealth  is received  by each bar- 
gainer)  directly  into their  utility  functions. 
To the extent that  players  may  have  distri- 
butional concerns in their utility functions, 
both  the  behavioral regularities  observed 
within these various experiments,  and per- 
haps some of  the marked differences  be- 
tween them, may share a common cause. 
The reason is that individual's  ideas about 
"fairness" seem to be both clear (see, for 
example, Daniel Kahneman,  Jack Knetch, 
and Richard Thaler (1986a,b)) and highly 
sensitive to  the context in which the issue 
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of  Menachem  Yaari  and  Maya  Bar-Hillel, 
1984). If ideas  about fairness play a signifi- 
cant  role  in  players' utility functions,  their 
clarity  would  help  account  for  the  regular 
behavior often  observed within each of  the 
previous experiments discussed here, as well 
as  in  our  own.  But the sensitivity of  these 
ideas  to  specific  contexts  could  well  mean 
that the differences in experimental environ- 
ments, subject pools,  and instructions'5 em- 
ployed  in different experiments16  could have 
much  larger  effects  than  would  be  antici- 
pated  if  bargainers' own  monetary payoffs 
were the only determinant of their utility. 
All  this is  not  to suggest that all or even 
most of the similarities and differences in the 
interpretations of earlier experiments can be 
traced to  uncontrolled elements of  bargain- 
ers' utilities.  In this regard, note  that many 
parts  of  the  data  gathered in  the  present 
experiment are consistent with observations 
made  in  earlier  experiments,  but  that  be- 
cause  of  the  somewhat  larger experimental 
design employed here, we interpret the data 
differently.17 
Notice  also  that we do not conclude that 
players  " try  to  be  fair."  It  is  enough  to 
suppose that they try to estimate the utilities 
of  the player they are bargaining with, and 
that, as discussed in the previous section, at 
least  some  agents incorporate distributional 
considerations in their utility functions. Since 
offers (not  to  mention agreements) reflect a 
bargainer's estimate of his opponent's behav- 
ior,  they  do  not  directly  reveal  anything 
about the utility of either individual.'8 How- 
ever, the data on rejections and counterpro- 
posals are at least in part data about individ- 
ual choice,  and Table 6 shows that, both in 
this experiment and in the previous ones we 
have discussed, the utilities cannot simply be 
assumed to be equal to the monetary payoffs 
of  the  players.  The  extent  to  which  this 
would  remain  true  if  the  bargaining  con- 
cerned  much  larger monetary payoffs  is  of 
course an empirical question, but we see no 
obvious  reason  to jump  to  the  conclusion 
that  the very consistent pattern of behavior 
observed here would disappear as the stakes 
become  larger,  particularly when  they  be- 
come  large for both bargainers. This is par- 
ticularly  so  since  there is  clear evidence of 
strategic considerations  in the present data, 
both in the consistent first-mover advantage, 
and in the fact that in most cases the equal 
division  offer is (also) outside of the 95 per- 
cent  confidence  interval  for  the  observed 
mean offers (see Figures IA, iB). 
Regardless  of  how  important  distribu- 
tional  considerations  turn out to be on bar- 
gaining  domains  involving  much  larger 
stakes,  the  consistency  of  these  considera- 
tions  across  experiments  demonstrated  in 
'5Indeed,  just  such  sensitivity  to  experimental  in- 
structions  has  been  observed in  a  related context  by 
Elizabeth  Hoffman  and Matthew Spitzer (1982,  1985). 
See  also  the ultimatum games reported by  Kahneirian 
et  al.  (1986a)  for  manipulations directly motivated by 
considerations of fairness. 
Among  the  many  differences in  how  the  expen- 
mnents  reviewed here were conducted, we note,  for ex- 
ample,  the  following.  The  experiments of  Guth  et  al. 
used German graduate students of economics attending 
a seminar to get credit for the final exams. Each partici- 
pant  could  see  all  the  others.  In  the  experiment  of 
B3inmore  et  al.,  pairs of  subjects bargained via linked 
microcomputers. They were not informed until after the 
first game  had  been  played  that player 2  would  play 
aniother  game as player 1. Their instructions include the 
statement "YOU  WILL BE DOING  US A  FAVOUR 
IF YOU  SIMPLY  SET OUT TO MAXIMIZE YOUR 
W'INNINGS." (All capital letters in original). The sub- 
jects  for the Neelin  et al. study were the members of an 
economics class. In their instructions is the phrase " You 
will be discussing the theory this experiment is designed 
to test in class." 
17For  example,  if we had looked only  at Cell 1 our 
conclusions  might  have  been  similar to  those  of  Bin- 
more et al., since  the data for that cell look as if after 
one  or  two  periods  of  experience,  the  players  settle 
down  to  perfect  equilibrium  proposals  (see  Figures 
IA, lB.) And if we had looked only at Cells 1 and 5, our 
conclusions  might have been similar to those of Neetin 
et al., since in  those two cells both the two- and three- 
period  games  yield  observations  near  the  two-period 
predictions (again, see Figure 1). And if we had looked 
only  at  Cells  5  and  6,  we  might have concluded,  like 
Giuth and Teitz, that the phenomena observed here was 
closely  related  to  the  relatively  extreme  equilibrium 
predictions in those cells. 
1For  example,  we  cannot  conclude  even  from  the 
striking relationship observed between maximum offers 
and equal division (in all but Cell 2: see Figures IA, IB) 
that  there  were  almost  always  some  players  1  who 
oreferred an equal division to a more unequal division. 
rhese players may simply have judged the risk of rejec- 
tion  of  a  more  unequal  offer to  have outweighed  the 
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Table  6  implies  that  experimenters ignore 
them at their peril. This is so not merely for 
experiments  concerning bargaining with  se- 
quential offers and counteroffers of the kind 
considered here, but for all bargaining exper- 
iments  (including  those designed to control 
for cardinal aspects of  the bargainers' utili- 
ties).'9  In  this  respect,  perhaps  our  main 
(albeit imprecise) conclusion is this: Bargain- 
ing is a complex  social phenomenon, which 
gives  bargainers systematic motivations dis- 
tinct from simple income maximization. This 
means  that  special  care  must  be  taken  in 
designing,  conducting, and interpreting bar- 
gaining experiments (and also in interpreting 
nonexperimental bargaining data). 
We  remark in  closing  that we  reach this 
conclusion (that explanation of at least some 
bargaining phenomena must be sought in the 
utility  functions  of  the bargainers) with the 
very greatest  caution,  and hope  that it  will 
be received in the same cautious spirit. If we 
were  to  take  the  point  of  view  that  any 
outcome  of bargaining could be "explained" 
by  an unobserved component of bargainers' 
utilities, we would have robbed the theory of 
content.  However,  the  data  on  disadvanta- 
geous counterproposals seem to us to clearly 
rule out the hypothesis  that all the bargain- 
ers  in  these  experiments  can  be  modeled 
as  maximizing  their own monetary payoffs. 
So  some  cautious  appraisal of  how particu- 
lar  bargaining  processes  and  environments 
might  influence  bargainers' utilities  seems 
called for. 
APPENDIX  1 
Instructions 
General. The purpose of  this experiment is to study 
how people behave in bargaining situations. During this 
experiment  you  will  participate in  several bargaining 
rounds.  At  the end  of  the experiment, one of  the bar- 
gaining  rounds  you  participated in  will  be  chosen  at 
random, and you will be paid in cash what you earned 
in that round. 
A  bargaining  round  involves  the  division  of  100 
chips  between  two  bargainers. Both  bargainers must 
agree on the division, otherwise neither side receives any 
chips for the round. A round lasts, at most, two periods. 
The  cash value of the chips distributed to an individual 
depends  on  the period in which agreement is reached. 
The cash value of a chip will also generally be different 
for  individuals  who  occupy  different bargaining posi- 
tions.  These  cash  values will be  written on  a message 
form  which  is  used  to  transmit proposals  from  one 
bargaining partner to the other. Are there any questions 
so far? 
At  the  end  of  the  instruction  period  you  will  be 
assigned to either the Left bargaining position or to the 
Right bargaining position. These assignments have been 
made randomly prior to your arrival. Your assignment 
is  designated  on  the  folder you  received after you  en- 
tered this room. 
In your folder is a card with your ID#.  (Don't  take 
it out right now.) You are to reveal your ID#  to no one 
other than a monitor during or after the experiment. 
The Conduct of a  Round. A  bargaining round pro- 
ceeds  as follows:  The Right position partner takes out 
of  a  pre-numbered  Message  Form,  such  as  the  one 
reproduced  on  the  next page. Let's look  at that form. 
Notice  that there are cash values per chip for both Left 
and  Right  bargainers.  Notice  that  these  cash  values 
diminish  as the periods proceed. In period 1 an agree- 
ment  is  worth  at  most $30  to either Left  or Right. If 
agreement is not reached in period 1 we go on to period 
2. In period 2 an agreement is worth at most $12 to Left 
and  at most $12 to Right. 
'9A series of  experiments, reviewed in  Roth  (1987), 
have players bargain over probabilities of winning some 
amount of money in "binary lottery games," in order to 
control  for the predictions made by theories expressed 
in  terms of  bargainers' expected utility. Those  experi- 
ments  also  observe  concentrations of  agreements that 
seem  to  bear  some  relation to  socially  recognized no- 
tions of fairness. In Roth, Michael Malouf, and J. Keith 
Murnighan (1981),  it was suggested that these concen- 
trations arose as some kind of coordination equilibrium. 
The possibility  that agents' utility functions themselves 
incorporate  significant distributional concerns suggests 
another  mechanism by  which such notions  of  fairness 
might  enter  into  the  bargaining.  The  results  of  the 
present experiment thus suggest some ways in which the 
results  of  those  quite  different experiments might  be 
reevaluated.  There  are respects in  which  this involves 
modeling  issues  at least as much as clear-cut empirical 
issues: to the extent that bargaining itself may engender 
changes  in  utility  involving  comparisons between  the 
bargainers, it may still be most fruitful to model this as 
part of the bargaining theory, rather than directly in the 
utility  functions  of  the bargainers, so that the underly- 
ing economic data of the problem should be measurable 
independently  of  the  course  of  the  bargaining.  And 
those experiments employed very different rules of bar- 
gaining  (for example,  bargaining was not  restricted to 
alternating  offers  and  counteroffers) which  may  influ- 
ence  the  bargainers'  utilities  differently.  In  this  last 
regard  it  is  nevertheless  worthwhile to  note  that  the 
substantial  percentage of  first-offer rejections observed 
in the sequential bargaining experiments is reminiscent 
of  the  substantial  percentage of  costly  disagreements 
observed  in  these  other  experiments (see  Roth,  1987; 
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Here's  how  a  round  proceeds.  The  Right  partner 
checks  that his or her ID#  on the form is correct and 
then makes a proposal for period 1. The proposal is of 
the form Left gets  chips; Right gets  chips. 
ROUND  #  Sample 
Message Form 
Left  Right 
ID#  ID# 
Left's cash value/chip  Right's cash 
value/chip 
Period 1 $.30/chip  Period 1 $.30/chip 
Period 2 $.12/chip  Period 2 $.12/chip 
Each proposal must add up to no more than 100 chips. 
Period One 
Right Proposes: Left gets_  chips; Right gets -  chips. 
End of Right's message. 
Left Responds:  accept  reject 
(circle one) 
If  Left  accepts,  draw  a  line  through the  remainder 
of form.  No other marks are to be made on the form. 
Period Two 
Left Proposes: Left gets  chips; Right gets  chips. 
End of Left's message. 
Right Responds:  accept  reject 
(circle one) 
The  form  is  collected  and  given  to  a  predesignated 
Left-position  player.  The  Left-position  player  enters 
his/her  ID#  and then enters a response. 
If Left's response is Accept, the round ends and each 
bargainer is credited with the Period 1 cash value of the 
chips agreed upon. 
If Left's response is Reject, the round continues into 
Period 2. 
The Left-side bargainer begins period 2 by making a 
proposal.  The proposal is of  the form Left gets 
chips;  Right  gets  chips.  The  message  form  is 
returned to  the  Right-side bargainer. If  Right  accepts 
Left's proposal then the round ends and each bargainer 
is credited with  his/her  respective Period 2 cash value 
of  the  chips  agreed upon.  If  Right  rejects Left's pro- 
posal,  the  round  ends  without  anyone's  earning any- 
thing. 
At  the end  of  a  round the message forms are col- 
lected  and you  are assigned a new bargaining partner 
for the next round. Any questions? 
Admissible Messages. No  communication is  allowed 
except that indicated on the Message Form. A Proposal 
must  be  written  as  two  nonnegative  whole  numbers 
(which  sum  to  no  more than 100) on  the places indi- 
cated  on  the  message  form. A  response is  to  be  indi- 
cated by circling either "Accept" or "Reject." Nothing 
else is to be written on the Message Form. 
Once the proposal is accepted no other messages are to 
be written, even though the Message Form is sent back 
and forth between bargainers. 
If  you  violate  these  rules your  agreements will  be 
void and you will not be paid anything for the round. 
Work Pad.  All  proposals are made in chips. Notice 
that there are always 100 chips to be divided. However, 
the  cash value of  chips differs from individual to indi- 
vidual  and  from  period  to  period. Therefore, a  work 
pad is provided so that you may calculate the cash value 
of  any proposal  you  might make or accept before you 
actually send any message. 
Personal History Forms. You have a set of  Personal 
History  forms. There is one form for each round. You 
must fill out this personal history form for each period 
of  each  round.  These  forms will  provide  you  with  a 
history of the chip proposals made, their cash values to 
you and to your bargaining partner and which proposal, 
if  any,  was  accepted.  You  may  wish  to  review  the 
history of your previous bargaining rounds when devel- 
oping  a strategy in later rounds. 
All the information on these forms is strictly private. 
Do  not show this form to any other participant. 
Method of Payment. At the end of this session we will 
randomly select one round from the rounds played and 
pay each person the cash value of the chips that person 
earned that round. Payment will be made in the Right 
Room  first. We will then repeat the selection procedure 
in the Left Room  and pay the Lefts. (Since selection is 
random, Lefts may not be paid on the basis of the same 
round as Rights.) 
Final Comments. You will be bargaining with a dif- 
ferent  person  each  round.  Your  ID #  is  your  own 
private  information.  Do  not  reveal  your  number  to 
anyone  during or  after the session.  What you  earn is 
your own business. It is in your interest to earn as much 
cash credit each round as you can. Any questions? 
Practice Round. We will now go  through a practice 
round together. Feel  free to ask questions at any point 
during this practice round. Put your instructions back in 
your folder. Those who have an  R on your folders will 
please go to the right side of this room. Those with an L 
please  go  to  the left  side. Those with the R  are Right 
players.  Those  with  the  L  are Left  players. After  the 
practice round, the Right players will go to the adjoin- 
ing  room.  Please  take your pens,  work pads,  and  the 
Personal History sheet marked "Practice Round" out of 
your  folders.  Please  use only  the pen provided. Right 
players,  please  take  out  the  Message  Form  marked 
"Practice Round." They will make the Round-One pro- 
posal. 
Proposers. Consider  your period-one  proposal. No- 
tice  the  cash  value/chip  for  both  yourself  and  your 
bargaining partner in the first and second periods. Use 
your work pad  to calculate the cash values of different 
proposals you might make. Remember, if your proposal 
is  accepted,  the period  1 cash values will apply. Don't 
write on  anything other than your work pad until you 
have decided on a proposal. When you have decided on 
a proposal  enter it on your Personal History Form for 
this  round  and  fill  in  on  your history  form  the  cash 
values  you  and  your bargaining partner will receive if 
your proposal is accepted. Next, enter your proposal on 
the message form. Do not write on the message  form until 
you  are certain of the proposal you wish to make. You 
may  not  change  a  message once  you  have  written it 
without  the permission of the monitor. When you have 
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on  the desk beside  you so that the monitor can collect 
them. 
Remember each proposal must sum to no more than 
100 chips. 
Tear off practice round message form. 
When  all of  the Right-side players have made their 
proposals  they  will  be  collected  and  delivered  to  the 
Left side. 
Left-Side Players: Write the proposal you have just 
received on your Personal History Form for this round. 
Notice  the cash value/chip  for both yourself and your 
bargaining partner. Calculate the cash values. Remem- 
ber, if you accept Right's period 1 proposal, the period 
1 cash values will apply. If you reject and make a period 
2  proposal  that  Right  accepts, then the period 2 cash 
values  will  apply.  Use  your work pad  to calculate the 
cash  values  of  different  proposals, you  might  make. 
Decide  whether  to  accept  or  reject the  proposal  you 
have just received. Indicate your decision on your Per- 
sonal  History sheet and then on your message form. If 
you  reject, write your new proposal on  your Personal 
History  sheet.  Next  enter your new proposal on  your 
message  form.  Do  not write on the message form until 
you are certain what you wish to do. You may not change 
a  message  form  once  you  have written it  without  the 
permission of the monitor. 
Remember each proposal must sum to no more than 
100 chips. 
Remember,  if  you  circled  accept  to  Right's  first- 
round proposal then you must also draw a line through 
the remainder of the message form. 
When  all  of  the  Left  players  have  responded  the 
forms are returned to the Right. 
Right: Update  your Personal History sheet. If your 
period-one  proposal  was  accepted  make  no  further 
marks on  the Message  Form. Otherwise, write the pro- 
posal  you  have just  received on your Personal History 
Form. Notice  the cash value/chip  for both yourself and 
your bargaining partner. Calculate the cash values. Re- 
member, if you accept Left's period 2 proposal, period 2 
cash value/chip  will apply. If you reject neither partner 
earns  anything  for  the  round.  Do  not  write  on  the 
message form  until you are certain what you wish to do. 
You  may  not  change  a  message  form once  you  have 
written it without  the permission of the monitor. 
The message forms are collected and returned to the 
Left. 
Left: Update  your Personal History sheet. 
The Message Forms are collected and returned to the 
Right. 
The round is now over. The monitors will collect the 
Message  Forms. 
We  have  now  completed  a  practice  round.  In  the 
bargaining  that  is  about  to  begin  you  will  engage  in 
several such rounds against different bargainers. One of 
these  rounds  will  be  chosen  at  random  to  determine 
your payoff. Any questions? 
Please place your materials back in your folders. 
Rights, please proceed to the next room. 
Lefts,  stay  here.  You  will  be  assigned  new  seats 
presently. 
Two-Period Personal History Form 
Round  #  ID# 
Personal History 
Left's cash value/chip  Right's cash value/chip 
Period 1 $.30/chip  Period 1 $.30/chip 
Period 2 $.12/chip  Period 2 $.12/chip 
The Period 1 proposal is 
Left gets  chips;  Right gets  chips. 
Cash value of proposal 
Left:  chips x $.30/chip  =  $- 
Right:  chips x $.30/chip  =  $- 
The Period 1 proposal was:  accepted 
rejected 
If the Period i  proposal was rejected then 
The Period 2 proposal is 
Left gets  chips;  Right gets  chips. 
Cash values of proposal 
Left:  chips x $.12/chip  = $- 
Right:  chips x $.12/chip  =  $ 
The Period 2 proposal was:  accepted 
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Three-Period Personal History Form 
ROUND  #  ID# 
Personal History 
Left's cash value/chip  Right's cash value/chip 
Period 1 $.30/chip  Period 1 $.30/chip 
Period 2 $.12/chip  Period 2 $.12/chip 
Period 3 $.05/chip  Period 3 $.05/chip 
The Period 1 proposal is 
Left gets  chips;  Right gets  chips. 
Cash value of proposal 
Left:  chips x $.30/chips  =  $- 
Right:  chips X $.30/chips  =  $- 
The Period 1 proposal was:  accepted 
rejected 
If the Period 1 proposal was rejected then 
The Period 2 proposal is 
Left gets  chips;  Right gets  chips. 
Cash values of proposal 
Left:  chips x $.12/chip  =  $- 
Right:  chips X $.12/chip  =  $- 
The Period 2 proposal was:  accepted 
rejected 
If the Period 2 proposal was rejected the Period 3 proposal is 
Left gets  chips;  Right gets  chips. 
Cash values of proposal 
Left:  chip x $.05/chip  =  $- 
Right:  chip x $.05/chip  =  $- 
The Period 3 proposal was:  accepted 
rejected 
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